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COMMENTS 
THE SECOND DEATH OF FEDERALISM 
William W. Van Alstyne* 
In 1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme Court 
distinguished acts of Congress regulating commercial relations from acts 
of Congress commanding the terms of state services. Last Term, in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court abandoned 
the distinction and held that it was principally for Congress to determine 
federalism questions. In this Comment, Professor Van Alstyne criticizes 
the Court on both counts. 
I 
In 1938, under cover of the commerce clause, Congress enacted a 
national minimum wage law.1 Somewhat affectedly styled the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the legislation applied to a large pro-
portion of the nation's private employers. Its central feature was its 
prohibition of wage agreements at hourly rates less than those Con-
gress fixed by law. 
One effect of the Act may have been to push some wages up to a 
stipulated national standard of "decency."2 Another effect may have 
been to eliminate jobs for those whose services were not valued at the 
federally mandated price. 3 Its problematic economics aside, the FLSA 
was also controversial as a matter of constitutional law. In due course, 
the Act was challenged on two separate grounds. 
The first ground was that Congress acted without sufficient consti-
tutional authority to preempt the differing state statutes and state 
common law already applicable to employment contracts. In brief, this 
was the federalism argument. The argument relied substantially on 
the tenth amendment and on Hammer v. Dagenhart, 4 an unadmired 
decision of the Supreme Court from 1918, conservatively interpreting 
• Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. - Ed. 
1. Pub. L. No. 95-151, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)). 
2. For the most recent judicial description and review of the FLSA, see Tony & Susan Alamo 
Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985). 
3. For an introductory review, see E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THE-
ORY AND APPLICATIONS 453-58 (1983); see also P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 368-70 (11th ed. 
1980). "What good does it do ... to know that an employer must pay ... $4.00 per hour if 
that fact is what keeps [one] from getting [a] job?" Id. at 369 (footnote omitted). 
4. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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the power of Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce. . among the sev-
eral States."5 On the basis of Hammer, it was alleged that even if an 
employer produced goods shipped and sold in interstate commerce, 
the wages paid its employees were not themselves such commerce. 6 
Accordingly, they could not be regulated by Congress but, at most, by 
the state of manufacture. 
The second ground of objection was more emphatic than the first. 
The objection was that the FLSA denied (substantive) due process to 
those whom it regulated and to those to whom it would deny jobs by 
artificially pricing their skills beyond the reach of employers otherwise 
willing to employ them. The argument was derived principally from 
Lochner v. New York, 1 an unadmired decision of the Supreme Court 
from 1905, liberally interpreting the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. If successful, it would have overridden state mini-
mum wage laws as well as supererogatory acts of Congress. 
In 1941, the FLSA was sustained by the Supreme Court against 
both objections in United States v. Darby.8 The due process objection 
was discredited on the strength of case law that had already effectively 
overruled Lochner so far as Lochner had limited the police power of 
the states to regulate conditions of labor.9 In Darby, the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause was construed to be no more limiting of 
congressional acts than the fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause was limiting of state acts. As for the alleged "want-of-congres-
sional-power" (federalism) objection, it, too, was rebuffed. The com-
pany's wage contracts were deemed to be sufficiently of a piece with its 
outbound commerce as readily to come within reach of national regu-
lation. Hammer v. Dagenhart, moreover, was explicitly overruled. 
The Darby case was decided by a unanimous Court, all of the (po-
litically) conservative pre-New Deal Justices except Justice Roberts 
having left the bench since the last cases relying upon Hammer v. 
Dagenhart. On its facts, however, Darby was not an acutely radical 
decision. Doctrinally it hardly strayed from a Marshallian view of the 
commerce clause as vesting in Congress a generous authority to deter-
mine the rule by which the terms of competition in interstate (and 
5. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
6. See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) ("Production is not com-
merce •••. "). 
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); 
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
8. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
9. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 
U.S. 426 (1917); see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
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foreign) commerce would be govemed. 10 The Darby Lumber Com-
pany was a conventional commercial enterprise. Its goods did com-
pete in the national market, 11 and the wages at issue were paid to 
produce those goods. 12 If these considerations did not bring it within 
range of Congress' power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the 
several States," it could only result from an ungenerous rule of con-
struction, a rule that the Court was not prepared to defend. Indeed it 
was not necessarily Darby (or cases like Darby)13 that necessarily led 
to suggestions on the original death of federalism. It was, rather, the 
subsequent series of endless judicial passive acquiescences that ap-
peared as Congress greatly expanded the FLSA and moved on to 
10. It is arguable that Darby but re-established the rule of generous construction, from which 
Hammer v. Dagenhart itself had departed. See the dissent by Holmes in Hammer, 247 U.S. at 
211; see also Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3 
So. L.Q. (now TuL. L. REv.) 175 (1918). For Marshall's general statement of the rule of gener-
ous construction respecting enumerated congressional powers, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-25 (1819). For its general explication in respect to the commerce clause 
in particular, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824). 
11. States are precluded by the "negative voice" of the commerce clause from disallowing the 
importation of goods from other states or from differentially taxing those goods even if they were 
manufactured under more permissive wage laws than a state's own. Given the inability of each 
such state to enact either sort of equalizing measure against the inbound goods from other states, 
any minimum wage law a state might attempt to impose upon its own producers might merely 
generate an externality enabling companies like Darby to capture the entire economic return. 
The frustration of each other state's internal police power (by operative effect of the negative 
voice doctrine) might mean either that Congress must in these circumstances have the power to 
intervene, or that no state could gain anything whatever (except a loss of business) from adopting 
a minimum wage law applicable to any local producer effectively subject to interstate or foreign 
competition within the state. This consideration, incidentally, had been alluded to by Justice 
Holmes, in his dissent for himself and three others, in Hammer v. Dagenhart. See the discussion 
in Powell, supra note 10, at 179-81. 
When no such consideration was present, on the other hand, Justice Holmes was appropri-
ately skeptical of any claim of power in Congress to try to use the tail of the commerce clause to 
wag the whole dog of the tenth amendment. As he cautioned elsewhere, "Commerce depends 
upon population, but Congress could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and 
divorce." Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,402 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
(See also his discussion oflegislative pretext, 193 U.S. at 411.) Implicit in Holmes' dictum is his 
own recognition that the tenth amendment is in part a synecdoche of subject matter allocation to 
the states: differences among state laws are assumed, even supposing that they may generate 
significant economic effects. John Marshall, incidentally, would have agreed. See Marshall's 
own statements in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,423 (1819) (dicta on legisla-
tive pretext) and see also JoHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 173, 187 (G. 
Gunther ed. 1969). 
12. See discussion in note 11 supra. 
13. Compare Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), in which the chance ultimate 
source of some of the local vendor's particular supplies in no way contributed to his business 
practices and in no respect did those practices threaten the efficacy of any other state's police 
power. The regulation reaching local vendors in McClung may have been "necessary and 
proper" to maintain the integrity of the regulation placed on their competitors doing substantial 
interstate business, see note 34 infra, and the decision in McClung may also be defensible under 
section 2 of the 13th amendment, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), but the 
rationale the Court accepted in McClung is not of a piece with Darby. It is, rather, a clear 
example of permitting the tail (the commerce clause) to wag the whole dog (the tenth 
amendment). 
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claim a more generalized police power at large.14 Thirty-three years 
after Darby, Congress took what seemed to many to be the ultimate 
step - a step too far. 15 
II 
In 1974, Congress decided that state governments should be re-
quired to operate under the same salutary wage constraints as private 
employers.16 That these were governments whose internal terms of 
employment Congress presumed to dictate, seemed no longer to make 
any difference. That none of the affected activity was commercial or 
in any other way comparable to that involved in Darby (it involved 
employing legislative staff, providing local fire protection, supervising 
parks and playgrounds, managing public housing for the poor, etc., as 
distinct from manufacturing goods for trade through national and in-
ternational markets) seemed equally of no account. Congress was un-
moved by such distinctions, evidently encouraged by three decades of 
judicial winking. Thus, Congress presumed to command the state~ by 
directing the terms of their own public service. 
Objecting that the commerce power did not authorize such a trav-
esty and that the tenth amendment disallowed Congress any power to 
dictate the terms of internal operations of state government in this 
fashion (to drive up the costs or to compel the abandonment of various 
public services),17 several states and a large number of state political 
subdivisions moved to enjoin the Act as amended. In National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 18 the Supreme Court agreed. It held the FLSA ex-
14. In his recent Storrs lectures, for instance, Bruce Ackerman suggests that the Court ulti-
mately treated the political will of persistent New Deal majorities as effectively adding an article 
V (un)written (non)amendment to the enumerated powers of Congress. In Ackerman's view, the 
new amendment vested in Congress a new power to define and to provide for the general welfare, 
thus effectuating a repeal of the tenth amendment. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discov-
ering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1056-57, 1064-65 (1984). For a critical review of 
Professor Ackerman's notions on article V, see Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitu-
tion: Part L Processes of Change, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 933, 951 n.51. 
15. In 1966, Congress extended the FLSA to cover certain public employees, including those 
at state hospitals, institutions, and schools. 80 Stat. 831, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The Court sus-
tained those amendments in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In 1974, Congress went 
further and extended the Act to all state employees. 88 Stat. 55, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s)(5), (x). 
The 1974 amendments prompted the Court, in Usery, to reconsider and overrule Wirtz. See 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 837-38, 854 (1976). 
16. See note 15 supra. 
17. For suggestions that the principal impact of the Act would fall most heavily on the most 
vulnerable services provided by state and local governments to the least well-to-do persons, see 
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1178-79 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of 
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1065, 1076 & n.42 (1977). 
18. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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tensions to be unconstitutional. 
The Court's decision in Usery was only the second decision striking 
down an act of Congress on pure federalism grounds in four decades, 19 
a period embracing a greater volume of sweeping federal statutes than 
the whole of our previous 150-year history. Like the only other feder-
alism decision adverse to Congress,20 Usery was decided by a five-to-
four vote. The critical vote, moreover, was self-consciously doubtful; 
Justice Blackmun only fretfully and barely concurred. And, as we 
know, his concurrence would not last. Usery was to be overruled in 
less than a decade, due solely to Justice Blackmun's change of mind.21 
Before turning to the case that overruled Usery, 22 however, some 
brief review of the Court's much-maligned reasoning in Usery itself 
may be useful. It is less clear to me than it may be to others that the 
decision was ill-reasoned or incorrect. In fact, the Usery case repre-
sented only the most modest sort of federalism restraint on Congress, 
a point often overlooked in the general academic rush to condemn it.23 
III 
Certain clauses in the Constitution other than the commerce 
clause, the Court noted in Usery, 24 grant to Congress very great power 
to influence the scope and shape of state and local services, and noth-
ing in the Usery decision affected those powers. The trucing powers of 
Congress are obviously superior powers, for instance, and, when exer-
cised, they effectively remove an immense amount of revenue from 
each state's reach. In tum, Congress has virtually unlimited discretion 
to specify the conditions states must meet to be eligible for such aid or 
grant programs that Congress provides under its power to spend for 
"the general welfare." Congress may elect to share nationally col-
lected revenues with state and local government almost entirely on 
19. The other such decision was Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which was super-
seded by the twenty-sixth amendment. Prior to Mitchell, the last decision holding against an act 
of Congress on federalism grounds was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
20. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Five Justices, including the Chief Justice, 
joined in three separate opinions to strike down the federal voting age requirement as applied to 
the states. There was no opinion of the Court. 
21. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). 
22. And it is in fact but one feature of that case, rather than Usery, to which the more 
substantial portion of this Comment is directed. See sections IV-VII infra. 
23. See note 17 supra; Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-d-Vis the States: The Dispen-
sability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights 
Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1978). An exception to the general disapproval 
greeting Usery, albeit qualified, is Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979). 
24. 426 U.S. at 843 n.17. 
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such terms as Congress alone thinks best. 25 It is not the case, there-
fore, that Congress is without appropriate influence in the uses of na-
tional largesse. 26 
But no national funds were involved in Usery, and consideration of 
the spending power merely underscores the contrast. Congress did 
not, for instance, require merely that projects funded through federal 
grants would have to pay according to the federal minimum wage. 
The Act of Congress was all stick and no carrot. The services to be 
affected were wholly state services and in no sense federal services. 
The Act was entirely coercive federalism and neither "co-operative" 
nor even "incentive" federalism; i.e., there was not even a partial sub-
sidy, much less a complete subsidy, to meet the costs of the federal 
demand imposed on purely state and local services.27 So far as Con-
gress was concerned, it was for Congress to command the states' deci-
sions - to pay more and to provide less as Congress alone might 
prefer. 
Certain other clauses in the Constitution may also vest in Congress 
a superior set of particular powers, the Court also noted, and these 
may sometimes be ample not merely to displace certain state laws but 
even, on occasion, to permit direct congressional command over the 
operations of state government. Thus, the majority in Usery expressly 
declined to overrule Fry v. United States, 28 (freezing state wage rates as 
an interim means of national inflation control); much less did it call 
into question any related war powers of Congress.29 The amended 
25. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Steward Mach. Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245,254, 
258 (1934); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479-80 (1923). I say "almost entirely" 
(rather than simply "entirely"), however, because the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
presumably will apply to forestall a complete end run around certain core constitutional features 
of federalism, despite the conventional wisdom of the spending power. It is doubtful, for in-
stance, that Congress could condition receipt of federal funds for state revenue-sharing by re-
stricting eligibility to those states whose legislatures would ratify a proposed constitutional 
amendment. (The assumptions of article V refute the idea.) It is similarly improbable that the 
Court, having held as it did in Oregon v. Mitchell, would thereafter sustain a limitation on reve-
nue-sharing confined to states that altered their laws to permit eighteen-year-olds to vote, or (for 
instance) undertook to move the state capitol to a location that, in the view of Congress, was 
more consistent with "the general welfare." Cf Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). Addi-
tionally, it remains arguable that the tenth amendment itself may interpose a requirement of 
"close fit" between conditions attached to federal funds and the demand made of recipient states, 
even in less obvious cases than these. 
26. But see the suggestion of some limitations even on the spending power, note 25 supra. 
27. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1008, 1020 (1985), 
Justice Blackmun notes in passing that substantial federal funding contributed to the local transit 
service, but compliance with the FLSA was not a feature of that funding; the issue was therefore 
examined solely under the commerce power, as in Usery. 
28. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
29. Usery, 426 U.S. at 855 n.18; see Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (examining congres-
sional war powers). 
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FLSA could not, however, draw any strength from clauses or claims 
of exigent national circumstance: there were no such circumstances, 
either real or even alleged. 30 
Finally, as the Usery Court also noted,31 the Constitution itself im-
poses a number of restrictions on the states as such, and nothing in the 
Usery decision affects the express powers vested in Congress appropri-
ately to enforce those restrictions. But no such congressional enforce-
ment powers were even vaguely relied upon to justify the minimum 
wage demands imposed on the states by the amended FLSA,.. It was 
never suggested, for instance, that state wages were so low, or that the 
conditions of public service so onerous, as to verge on a system of state 
peonage, which Congress could disallow under the enforcement clause 
of the thirteenth amendment. 32 And, unlike the Equal Pay Act 
amendments of 1963, or the 1972 anti-discrimination amendments to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the FLSA state minimum 
wage requirements could not be sustained as an enforcement of the 
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.33 
Moreover, no claim was made that extending the FLSA to state 
and local government was necessary or proper simply as a means of 
insuring the integrity of the FLSA as applied to those whom Congress 
could reach (and had already reached) under the commerce power. 
This was clearly not a case in which Congress, having fixed the mini-
mum wage for employees of firms in interstate commerce, found that 
those firms would be threatened with competitive ruin unless it also 
fixed the minimum wage of local firms. 34 In no respect was it sug-
30. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
31. 426 U.S. at 843 n.14. 
32. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... : shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (This prohibition clearly 
forbids conditions of forced labor by state governments, as well as private peonage maintained 
under state law.). 
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII, § 2 (For a modem example of the latitude of this clause, see Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968).). 
33. See and compare, for instance, Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity v. 
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam), and Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), with EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). Norris and Manhart 
sustained direct congressional prohibition of state gender-based annuity tables under title VII, 
pursuant to Congress' enforcement powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. In 
EEOC v. Wyoming. the Court avoided addressing whether Congress had the power under the 
enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment to prohibit states from setting a mandatory 
retirement age (fifty-five) for state game wardens. 460 U.S. at 243. The government's attempt to 
anchor its prohibition in its fourteenth amendment enforcement powers was strained. See Mas-
sachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (state statute mandat-
ing retirement of state police officers at age fifty, held not to violate the equal protection clause). 
34. Cf. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (intrastate rates 
may be fixed to protect viability of interstate rates); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964). In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), the Court upheld 
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gested that private employers subject to the FLSA would be at risk 
unless state and local governments were compelled to pay police, fire-
men, school teachers, etc., at the same minimum rates. 35 
The foundations of the FLSA extensions were therefore extremely 
shaky. Essentially, they amounted to an assertion by Congress: as the 
Court had previously sustained acts regulating some scarcely commer-
cial activities by private parties far removed from interstate trade, pre-
sumably the Court would see nothing in the tenth amendment 
disallowing the imposition of identical restrictions directly on state 
and local government. In brief, whatever Congress might preempt from 
state regulation (namely, the determination of wages), it might also 
command of the states themselves (namely, the payment of wages). 
Congress acknowledged no distinction between a principle of con-
strained dual sovereignty and a virtually unlimited claim of command 
sovereignty: a plenary national power to dictate the terms of state and 
local government. The auspices of the federal claim for control, more-
over, were themselves highly confrontational. Congress provided no 
reason for directing higher wages to be paid to state and local employ-
ees beyond its own naked preference. 
Indeed, for all of these reasons it is quite arguable that the major-
ity's opinion in Usery was unduly modest rather than too sweeping. 
The Rehnquist opinion held the FLSA extensions invalid only as ap-
plied to state and local agencies performing "traditional governmental 
functions." The distinction thus implied by the majority would invite 
endless controversy. "Traditional" might be synonymous with "cus-
tomary" as of some particular date, e.g., 1791, when the Bill of Rights 
was adopted. Alternatively, "traditional" might be synonymous with 
"conservative,"36 i.e., with minimalist theories of proper governmental 
an act of Congress forbidding racial exclusion by a large (216 room) motel and restaurant ca-
tering to interstate travelers. In McC/ung, the act was similarly sustained as applied to a local 
restaurant. As local restaurants free to exclude persons forbidden by federal law to be excluded 
by their competitors might thereby divert a large portion of local customers away from their 
rivals, Congress could quite reasonably conclude that the inclusion of such enterprises was both 
"necessary and proper" to maintain the integrity of the rule it had imposed upon the other 
restaurants, i.e., those doing substantial (but of course not exclusively) interstate business. Omit• 
ting direct competitors of regulated enterprises from the same regulation might well expose the 
regulated class to economic ruin. The necessary and proper clause enables Congress to avoid 
that result. Compare this suggestion, Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry., and the discussion in note 13 
supra (alternative analysis under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment), with the different (more 
doubtful) analysis accepted by the Court in McC/ung, and criticized in note 13 supra. 
35. Nor was there any suggestion that the indiscriminate application of the FLSA to state 
and local services was sustainable under the commerce clause as some sort of valid limitation on 
state combinations in restraint of trade. See and compare the "state action" line of cases adjudi-
cated under the Sherman Act, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of Lafayette v, 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
36. One might associate this view with Usery because the opinion for the Court was provided 
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functions: to provide laws mediating claims of private right, a police 
force to maintain order, and a court system for adjudications, and no 
more. Under either view, if a state undertook something new in the 
provision of public service, or otherwise moved beyond the grim role 
of the nightwatchman state, it would have to yield to Congress the 
power to determine the terms. Either way of drawing the line would 
pose problems for several Justices who would understandably resist a 
notion that the Constitution embeds some bright line conservative 
principle respecting the "proper" role of state government. 
The test was a misfortune understood in these terms; its obvious 
invitation would be exploited with devastating effect in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 37 The (new) majority would 
ridicule the idea and, by making a very strong case that the tenth 
amendment yielded no distinction of this sort, would dismiss the en-
tirety of Usery as no better than a brick without straw. But it might all 
have been otherwise. Indeed, it is strongly arguable that Usery fell vic-
tim to a premature and unwarranted hostility. Several Justices, re-
spectfully, did not try to make it work. Rather, those Justices 
originally in dissent from Justice Rehnquist's analysis failed to treat it 
in the manner the Court has otherwise wisely tended to do in 
equivalent circumstances associated with great cases: not as the final 
word on the subject, but as the first words. 38 
A less hostile view of Usery might have sought to develop its basic 
distinction between preemption and command, in much more moder-
ate fashion. The superior power of Congress as to the former would 
have remained unaffected. The exceptional hubris of the latter would 
require a suitable justification, quite parallel to what the first amend-
ment requires in its field of concern. 
Under this view of the matter, the existence of a public agency 
under state or local governmental auspices would itself suffice as clear 
evidence that the services it provides come within the felt responsibili-
ties of government in the first instance, as determined solely by the 
constituents and representatives of that government. 39 Whether the 
by one of its most (politically) conservative members, Justice Rehnquist. Nevertheless, the sug-
gestion would be inappropriate since the public services at issue in Usery itself included several 
kinds of services not embraced by minimalist theories of government (e.g., part-time employment 
of teenagers to superintend municipal park playgrounds during summer time). 
37. 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1010-16 (1985) (applying the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime pay 
provisions to a metropolitan transit authority); see also United Transp. Union v. Long Island 
R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982). 
38. Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 
(12 How.) 299 (1851). 
39. Cf. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1720 (1985) ("We may pre-
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need is for the ordinary protection of life and property (e.g., a police 
department, a judicial system), or for schools, parks, day care centers, 
or gravel pits (for patching local roads), the Constitution does not 
draw a line. Nothing we know about the tenth amendment suggests 
that it meant to limit the range of public services a state might provide 
to one or another of these things, even assuming (as we may) that 
nothing in the Constitution requires them, either. 
If, then, a state wishes to provide opportunities for education 
(rather than to leave such opportunities to the vicissitudes of the pri-
vate market), the tenth amendment need not be construed to treat that 
decision as less worthy than the decision to provide a state highway 
patrol. If a community resolves to establish a public day care center, it 
cannot be the case that the tenth amendment draws a shadow across 
its path. Accordingly, if Congress is nonetheless allowed to interfere 
with those purely state and local programs, under Usery it would be 
required to back its authority with a judicially acceptable reason in 
every such case, and not simply in those involving "traditional" public 
services as previously defined. The reason, moreover, could not be a 
mere naked preference by Congress to have state and local programs 
administered as Congress might like - the tenth amendment would 
disallow any such claim. Rather, the reason would need to relate to 
the imperatives of things otherwise within the power of Congress to 
command, just as Usery so reasonably suggested.40 
sume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest.") (foot-
note omitted). In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), Justice 
Blackmun joined the dissent in rejecting the Chief Justice's distinction (for antitrust state exemp-
tion purposes) between "governmental" and "proprietary" services; he regarded it as too narrow. 
The dissent argued that all governmental action, even that termed "proprietary," should be ex-
empt from Sherman Act scrutiny. 435 U.S. at 432-34. Justice Blackmun noted, in particular, 
that imposing treble damage liability upon state and local governments could have a "grave" 
impact upon their ability to provide necessary governmental services. 435 U.S. at 442. (I am 
indebted to Professor Eleanor Fox for these helpful observations.) 
40. If a distinction in the latitude of congressional override power is to be drawn based not 
on a claim of exceptional circumstance, but on the nature of the state or local government activ-
ity, moreover, it would need to be some sort of distinction between "commercial" and "noncom-
mercial" activity rather than between "traditional" and "nontraditional" (or between 
"governmental" and "proprietary") public services. A "commercial/noncommercial" distinc-
tion responds to the distinction explicit in the commerce clause itself, as the other attempts at 
categorization do not. Under this view, the more the state's own commercial practices (e.g., 
making cars for sale at market prices to compete with G.M. or Ford) mingle in national commer-
cial markets, the greater its subordination to such rules of trade as Congress may otherwise see fit 
to impose upon that trade. 
Perversely, perhaps, the Court has recently tended to shelter state action when the state has 
intervened as a market participant (e.g., as a buyer or seller), although in fairness the Court may 
have been correct in not regarding the particular enterprises or practice at issue as other than 
public services. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 
(1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 
794 (1976) (commerce clause exemption, despite discriminatory in-state preference in state sales 
and state purchases). See also the manner in which the Court has attempted to prick out a line 
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In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Associa-
tion, 41 the Court attempted diffidently to restate Usery in a four-part 
test.42 The first part of the restated test was that the federal statute in 
question must presume to regulate "the 'States as States,' " which, the 
Court later conceded, the statute in Garcia, like the statute in Usery, 
had presumed to do.43 The second part of the test was that the statute 
must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sover-
eignty,'" which, the Court conceded grudgingly, the statute in Garcia 
also presumed to do.44 Third, forcing the state to comply with the 
federal statute must "directly impair [the state's] ability 'to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,' "45 
a test that need not have been at all difficult to satisfy, depending 
partly on what one thought it meant.46 Fourth, the relative impor-
tance and "the nature of the federal interest advanced [must not] be 
such [as to] justif[y] state submission,"47 a fair enough requirement in 
itself, and one which the Court did not identify as having been met.48 
In Garcia, Justice Blackmun particularly picked on the allegedly 
vacuous nature of the third part of the test,49 but we have already seen 
that it need not have been treated with such hostility. The question of 
"traditional governmental function," is acceptable if understood in a 
perfectly ordinary, straightforward way. It is simply the tradition of 
state and (more typically) of local governments to supply public ser-
vices that they find consistent with the public welfare and unsuitable 
to leave to other providers, nothing more. Accordingly, the determi-
between the "commercial" and the "noncommercial," for first amendment (speech) distinctions, 
e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
41. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
42. 452 U.S. at 287-88 & n.29; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. 
Ct. 1005, 1010-11 (1985). 
43. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287. In both cases the state's own provision of local service was the 
direct object of the federal statute. In Usery, the minimum pay feature of the FLSA was at issue; 
in Garcia, it was the overtime pay feature. In contrast, in the Hodel case the state as such was 
not the direct object of regulation; the mining regulation at issue was challenged on behalf of 
private commercial companies (as in Darby) as invading state regulatory powers. 
44. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. It is not clear why the matter at issue should have to be "indis-
putably" an attribute of state sovereignty, rather than simply "an attribute of state sovereignty," 
but one may pass over that question for the moment. In any event, the Court seems to concede in 
Garcia that providing for local public transportation is well within a state (or local) government's 
choice of services to provide as a state, unlike making treaties, regulating purely interstate carri-
ers, taxing federal instrumentalities, or declaring war. The latter are also attributes of sover-
eignty, but they have been constitutionally reserved from the states. 
45. 452 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added). 
46. See text at note 40 supra and at note 49 infra. 
47. 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. 
48. Cf. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
49. 105 S. Ct. at 1011-16. 
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nation of those services, by whom administered, and at what rates of 
pay, etc., are exclusively determinations for state and local govern-
ments in the first instance. If (but only it) their operation can fairly be 
described as somehow interfering with commerce (whether interstate 
or foreign) within Congress' power to control, may they properly be 
restricted, albeit, of course, only to the extent of their interference with 
that commerce. It is not the "traditional" or "nontraditional" nature 
of the·public services that matters; it is, rather, the extent to which the 
manner of their execution interferes with what Congress has a right to 
control. This "test" (if one must call it that) may necessarily require a 
certain amount of judgment and wisdom on the part of the Court, but 
it is not worse on that account. Indeed, it is exactly such judgment and 
wisdom the Court is expected to provide. It is the very measure of the 
Court's own obligation. 
In Garcia, however, Justice Blackmun does not provide it.50 
Rather, he suggests that there is no need to do so. "[W]e are con-
vinced," he declared for the Court, "that the fundamental limitation 
that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to 
protect the 'States as States' is [merely] one of process .... "51 It is 
for Congress, not the Court, to measure the scope of the commerce 
power and the countervailing weight of the tenth amendment. Such 
protection as the states may have from direct imposition of congres-
sional commands is thus in fact not constitutional and substantive, but 
merely constitutive and political. 52 The Constitution is deemed to fix 
the principal locus of tenth amendment adjudication in Congress. If 
so, then indeed we have witnessed the second death of federalism. 
IV 
The Garcia case, with its overruling of Usery, attracted a fair 
amount of journalistic comment. Much of that comment was interest-
ing but predictably limited to Garcia's immediate practical implica-
50. The Garcia majority opinion fails to identify any special circumstance or any overriding 
federal interest of any sort to justify the federal government's intrusion. To the contrary, the 
Court disclaims any obligation to identify such an interest or to require that Congress do so. 
Indeed, this is the feature of Garcia that spells its importance in overruling Usery. Garcia consti-
tutes a complete repudiation of the foundations of Usery, rather than a mere disagreement with 
its result. 
51. 105 S. Ct. at 1019. (Second brackets, [merely], added for emphasis.). 
52. To be sure, there is some slight hedging on the point, but it appears to be more patroniz-
ing than promising. Justice Blackmun writes of political process safeguards as the "principal" 
(rather than as the sole) limitation upon Congress. 105 S. Ct. at 1018, 1020. He also cites Coyle 
v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), although it is difficult to say why, since the rationale of Garcia 
would otherwise be ample to sustain acts of Congress well drawn to "persuade" states to move 
their state capitols to their principal centers of commerce. 
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tions.53 The (London) Economist, however, was more discerning.54 It 
reported an appropriate sense of English puzzlement. It appeared to 
The Economist that the Supreme Court had partly repudiated Mar-
bury v. Madison, 55 in favor of a rule of parliamentary supremacy in 
respect to the boundaries of federalism. "[I]t is curious," The Econo-
mist observed, "that in the San Antonio case the justices explicitly 
overruled a decision they had made only nine years before." It then 
went on to note something even "more startling": 
Even more startling, though, was the view of federalism that the ma-
jority put forward to support its decision. The court could have made its 
ruling on a narrow technical ground. It did not. Justice Harry Black-
mun, whose change of heart since 1976 was enough to shift the court, 
wrote in the majority opinion that the protection of the states from fed-
eral power "inhered principally in the workings o( the national govern-
ment itself," rather than in the constitution as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court. In other words, the states have some influence on con-
gress and the president; if they do not succeed in using it to keep Wash-
ington from encroaching unduly on their powers, they should not expect 
the court to do the job for them by declaring federal laws unconstitu-
tional. This view, said one of the dissenting justices, Mr. Lewis Powell, 
"rejects almost 200 years of the understanding of the constitutional sta-
tus of federalism." 
[The Blackmun opinion] also called into question a central principle 
of the Supreme Court's own constitutional position. Since 1803 the court 
has claimed the authority . . . to invalidate actions of the federal gov-
ernment if they conflict with the constitution. The San Antonio decision 
seems to suggest that the principle of judicial review does not apply to ques-
tions of federalism when congress acts under the commerce clause. 
[T]he Supreme Court seems to have declared that judicial enforce-
ment of the constitutional position on federalism is at an end. 56 
Is the "judicial enforcement of the constitutional position on feder-
alism at an end" and, if it is, why? Is it because the general approach 
of the Court in Usery was improper and, if it was, what made it so? Or 
does Garcia actually insinuate a different sort of answer altogether, 
even as The Economist suggests it does - that federalism questions in 
general (and not merely in Garcia-type cases) are not for the Court, 
but fundamentally for Congress, finally to determine? 
All of these seem to me to be excellent questions, and some I have 
already obliquely addressed. 57 It is only the last of these, however, 
53. E.g., the impact of the decision on state and local budgets, and the kinds of additional 
legislation the decision might encourage Congress to adopt (such as amending the national labor 
relations acts to compel collective bargaining in the public sector). 
54. Nine for the seesaw, THE EcoNOMIST, Mar. 2, 1985, at 21. 
55. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
56. Nine for the seesaw, supra note 54, at 21 (emphasis added). 
57. E.g., that the general approach of the Court in Usery was sound, and that the repudiation 
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that I want now to address. The larger idea it may contain is funda-
mentally pernicious to the integrity and morale of American constitu-
tional law. It is worth a wholly separate comment of its own. 
V 
The constitutional clauses examined in Usery 58 and reexamined in 
Garcia have borne more of the burden of federalism litigation than any 
other clauses, including the spending clause. From the beginning, 
moreover, there has been a blurriness in their scope and an admitted 
uncertainty in measuring their margins, even as reflected in the tumul-
tuous reactions to the Court's earliest decisions.59 
Even so, with all the ups and downs of judicial vagary, the com-
merce clause and the tenth amendment have not until now been read 
as though they declared that it was not for the Court, but rather for 
Congress, to determine the extent to which enumerated powers permit 
the displacement of state laws or the command of state governments. 
Rather, each has been a staple of substantive judicial review. It has 
been for Congress to decide what to do. It has been for the Court to 
say whether it was within Congress' power to do it. 
The results of that judicial review have not always been consistent, 
but perfect consistency is not to be expected insofar as judicial atti-
tudes must themselves vary and none is particularly entitled to control 
all the rest. 60 Usually, however, even in close cases when the federal-
ism claim has failed (as most often it has indeed failed), it has failed 
because the Court has yielded to an assertion of some overriding fed-
eral interest it deemed adequate to rationalize the exceptional intru-
siveness of the challenged act. 61 In Garcia, as I have noted, the 
majority identified no such overriding interest. Rather, it deemed itself 
of its reasoning in Garcia is quite unconvincing. It is Garcia, more than Usery, that requires 
justification, and nothing in the opinion itself satisfactorily provides it. 
58. I.e., the co=erce clause, the necessary and proper clause, and the tenth amendment. 
59. For instance, shortly after the Marshall Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Marshall's long-standing critic and rival, Judge Roane, accused the 
Court of so subversive and loose a construction of article I, section 8 powers as to have utterly 
destroyed the foundations of federalism - an accusation Marshall hotly denied. See the superb 
exchange in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 11, and for 
related materials, see G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 82-92 
(11th ed. 1985). 
60. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982). 
61. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975) (upholding application of federal 
wage restraints as a national emergency measure); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (upholding 
application of the Emergency Price Control Act); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942) (major disorders in national and world wheat markets held to warrant regulation of farm-
consumed wheat which, in the aggregate, !night substantially affect ultimate market quantities 
and price). 
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excused from this element of judicial review. It then weakly explained 
that it regarded the political safeguards of federalism to be the appro-
priate check against unconstitutional excesses by Congress. 
By itself, this may do no more than to overrule Usery, i.e., to elimi-
nate any requirement of justification even when Congress presumes to 
command the states themselves and even when it is not asserted that 
the states are engaging in commerce. Writ large, however, as the 
sources relied upon by Justice Blackmun would have us do, 62 such 
alleged political safeguards of federalism may excuse the Court from 
answering any other question of a like kind as well. The practical 
choice between state action and national action generally, indeed al-
ways, in this view, is not to be judicially constrained but only politi-
cally constrained. To be sure, the Constitution may appear to have 
made an allocation (enumerating what may be national and homoge-
neous, reserving the rest to the states and protecting them in some 
measure from being commanded as well as preempted), but it is best 
not for the judiciary to say whether the constitutional plan is being 
adhered to. The determinations to be made are more appropriately 
resolved in Congress where the respective interests are able to work 
out the appropriate accommodations, rather than in the courts. The 
constitutional plan is thus not checked by an impacted litigant's stand-
ing to object as a sore loser in court; it is checked, rather, by the struc-
tural representation already amply afforded the states by the 
Constitution. 
If, then, "the states" or "the people" do not appear to keep Con-
gress to the plan, it may be because they do not see any real departure 
from that plan; alternatively, supposing they do, presumably they do 
not regard the departure as an undesirable rearrangement. Under 
these circumstances, it is scarcely for the courts to say that the Em-
peror, i.e., Congress, has no clothes. For the Constitution itself (under 
this view) relies upon the finality of federal politics, rather than judi-
cial review, to determine the sufficiency of the national wardrobe. It is 
the role of the judiciary to uphold and enforce the majoritarian verdict 
on these questions and not to oppose it with a perception of its own. 
Generally, the argument to this effect (which the Garcia case sug-
gests the Court now flirts with), has been opposed principally in terms 
62. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS 175-
84 (1980), cited in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1018 n.11 
(1985). (The same footnote also cites to an article by Wechsler, urging extreme deference to 
Congress although not outright abdication of the judicial function. See Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).) 
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of the alleged naivete of its political science.63 Unquestionably that 
objection is well taken64 but, ironically, to press one's objection in such 
terms is in one sense to miss the point of what is being said. It puts the 
real objection on quite the wrong ground. Even to participate in that 
debate is in one sense to lose it. It implies that if, as, or when (in the 
Court's view) such structural safeguards might reasonably be seen as 
adequate, 65 at least then and to that extent it would be inappropriate 
not to defer to them. Alternatively, it may concede even more, namely, 
that if it is true that the Constitution deems such safeguards adequate, 
the Court should not set up its opposing opinion, even if the Court 
finds those safeguards inadequate. In brief, if it is part of the constitu-
tional plan that the constitutional boundaries of federalism are to be 
politically settled, rather than judicially maintained until altered by 
amendment, then the Court should, in decency, respect its assigned 
(non)role in such matters. 
This is the strong form of what Justice Blackmun seems to have 
implied in the critical part of Garcia. And it is exactly this implication 
that raised an English eyebrow in surprise, as well it should. Stripped 
of its elegance, Garcia proposes the piecemeal repeal of judicial review. 
It also involves a double counting of what are in fact merely pre-judi-
cial and post-judicial "safeguards" of the American constitutional 
plan, safeguards (such as they are) merely additional to, and not in 
substitution of, substantive judicial review. 
The Constitution does of course notice the states other than 
through article III, i.e., other than in the duty of article III judges to 
hold an act of Congress invalid when, in an appropriate case, the gov-
ernment is unable to demonstrate the consistency of the act with the 
federalism provisions of the Constitution. It notices them in the repre-
sentation formula of the Senate, with its assurance of two senators per 
state irrespective of size. It notices them in the Electoral College. It 
notices them in article V, with regard to the states' power to initiate 
and ratify proposed amendments, etc. How well (or ill) these constitu-
63. See, e.g., the discussion and references in footnote 9 of Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia, 
105 S. Ct. at 1025-26. 
64. I do not wish to argue the point here for reasons which will be fully developed in a 
moment, i.e., that nothing turns on its outcome. Still, it does seem so implausible to think that 
American politics will operate per se to constrain Congress within any serious person's view of 
merely regulating "Commerce ..• among the several States" (especially in the absence of the 
threat of judicial review), as virtually to compel one's skepticism that those who assert this argu-
ment can possibly believe it. Unless, then, one wishes to regard the entire set of provisions re-
specting enumerated powers as mere precatory expressions in the Constitution (and similarly to 
regard the tenth amendment as though it said, "Such power as Congress elects not to exert may 
to that extent leave something for state and local governments to do"), it is difficult to take the 
political science portion of the whole "safeguards" argument as other than a good-hearted joke. 
65. Exactly as Justice Blackmun appears so to have regarded them in Garcia. 
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tive provisions contrive to keep Congress and the President in check, 
one may measure for oneself. Unless, however, they are designed not 
as merely additive to the safeguards of substantive judicial review but 
rather as partial or whole substitutes for that review, their speculative 
efficacy or inefficacy is utterly without relevance in constitutional liti-
gation. They are, with all respect, not the proper concern of the 
Supreme Court in the adjudication of a particular case. 
Concretely, if in the Court's view the bare bones of the commerce 
clause are insufficient as against the particular objections fielded in the 
Garcia case, then the Court must say so. As to that question, more-
over, nothing can be derived from references to constitutive processes. 
The Court may not appropriately uphold an act of Congress based on 
reasoning that relies even partly on some theory of renvoi to what are, 
at best, altogether separate possible sources of constraint. 66 Those 
constraints either worked or did not work (to hold Congress within 
the boundaries laid down), and it is for the Court now to answer 
whether they did. The inputs of those features of the Constitution are 
now concluded. The product is at hand. The special "safeguard" of 
the Court's independent view of constitutional consistency is now re-
quested. The litigant asks for the Court's answer. What, then, shall 
the Court say? Shall it say this: 
It is not for us to say whether the Emperor (Congress) has no 
clothes. In a representative democracy such as ours, it is principally for 
66. And significantly, John Marshall (who is too frequently cited as an author of "deference" 
review), emphatically agreed. In his defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall examined sev-
eral objections Judge William Brockenbrough, writing under the pseudonym "Amphictyon," 
raised against his opinion in the case. Among these was what Marshall took to be a suggestion by 
Brockenbrough that if the Court were to uphold the congressional act at issue in the case, then it 
ought not have done so pursuant to its own-interpretation of enumerated powers, an interpreta-
tion with which Brockenbrough disagreed. Rather, it should have done so strictly on the basis of 
"judicial modesty,'' i.e., on the basis that "it was for Congress to have judged of [the] necessity 
and propriety [of the act], and having exercised their undoubted functions in so deciding, that it 
was not consistent with judicial modesty to say there was no such necessity, and thus to arrogate 
to themselves a right of putting their veto upon a law." JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCul-
loch v. Maryland, supra note 11, at 104 (Marshall, quoting "Amphictyon") (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
Far from welcoming Brockenbrough's suggestion, much less welcoming it by suggesting that 
in essence this is what the Court had done in McCulloch, Marshall denounced the idea and 
heaped scorn on it. He insisted that "[i]t was incumbent on them [the judges] to state their real 
opinion and their reasons for it." Id. at 105. He derided Brockenbrough's advice, noting how 
such an approach would imply that the judges actually doubted the constitutionality of the act, 
while nonetheless upholding it. "Would this reasoning have satisfied, or ought it to have satisfied 
the publick?,'' Marshall asked rhetorically. Id. He left no doubt of his own answer: 
The question is, and ought to be considered, as a question of fair construction. Does the 
constitution, according to its true sense and spirit, authorize Congress to enact the particu-
lar law which forms the subject of inquiry? If it does, the best interest of the people, as well 
as the duty of those who decide, require that the question should be determined in the 
affirmative. If it does not, the same motives require a determination in the negative. 
Id. at 160-61 (emphasis added). 
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the people who are affected by such things to determine, represented as 
they are, and as the states are as well, in the constitutive process of Con-
gress and of the Presidency. They evidently think that Congress' clothes 
(i.e., its powers) are sufficient; otherwise we do not suppose they would 
have condoned the adoption of this act as impliedly consistent with the 
Constitution. Moreover, to the extent that the act may appear to breach 
the federalism boundary, recourse against the alleged breach remains 
fully available even now through those same constitutive processes 
which our Constitution provides as the principal check on all federalism 
questions. 
To be sure, we have read the complaint in this case, the answer, and 
the briefs that have been submitted and we agree that it is not at all clear 
how the power to dictate the terms of a municipal service not constitut-
ing commerce or interfering with commerce among the states fits within 
the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states. 
Neither is it clear how the act can in these circumstances be squared 
with the tenth amendment. Neither have we been presented with a sug-
gestion of special circumstances as might warrant such a regulation ex-
ceptionally, or demonstrate that it is a necessary and proper means of 
protecting that which all agree Congress has the undoubted power to 
control. Admittedly, too, Congress did not purport to adopt this act as 
an authorized enforcement measure of some restriction the Constitution 
itself provides, nor has anyone suggested the act has such a foundation. 
It is also true, we admit, that the regulation is not simply an incident of 
federal assistance; no one claims it is associated with the spending power. 
This act of Congress may therefore seem to have a certain peculiar 
nakedness. Nonetheless, we think the constitutive processes provide 
such protection as is appropriate and, accordingly, we sustain the law. 
In brief, on matters of this sort (i.e., federalism issues), we are inclined to 
paraphrase Lord Chief Justice Holt: "[A]n Act of [Congress] can do no 
wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd .... " 67 
What is wrong with this (and it is wrong) is that it is a misrepre-
sentation of the Constitution that we have, whether or not it projects 
the likeness of a Constitution some might think would be better (i.e., 
more democratic?) than the one we have. What is wrong with it is its 
double counting of the pre-judicial and post-judicial constitutive polit-
ical "safeguards." 
The jurisprudence of Garcia interjects a wholly fictitious clause 
into article I. It is a clause that commits to Congress (or, if you like, 
to the "constitutive processes" operative in restraint of Congress) the 
power to decide how far the power to regulate commerce should ex-
tend. It is a clause that is not there and doubtless would never have 
been adopted. 68 Alternatively, the jurisprudence of Garcia interpolates 
a different sort of clause in article III. It is a clause that provides for 
67. City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1701). 
68. See Part VI infra; see also Part VII infra. 
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the withdrawal of substantive judicial review of "mere" federalism 
questions, in such measure as the Supreme Court concludes may be 
best left to constitutive politics. It, too, is a clause that is not there and 
had any such clause been included, it would almost certainly have led 
to the defeat of the entire Constitution. 69 
It is a signal disservice for the Court to imagine either kind of 
clause and, assuredly, it does no credit to the specialness of the judicial 
power of the United States. One may hope that the trend will not be 
pursued. Surely, Garcia is not to be the last word. 
VI 
In the course of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, on Au-
gust 15, 1787, John Mercer, delegate from Maryland, rose to speak 
against the power of judicial review over acts of Congress. According to 
Madison: 
He [Mercer] disapproved of the doctrine, that the judges, as expositors of 
the Constitution, should have the authority to declare a law void. He 
thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be 
uncontrollable. 70 
Mercer was followed by John Dickinson, delegate from Delaware. 
As reported by Madison, Dickinson agreed with Mercer: 
Mr. DICKINSON was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mer-
cer, as to the power of the judges to set aside the law. He thought no 
such power ought to exist. 71 
Immediately thereafter, an elaborate discussion ensued, designed 
principally to secure some clarification of the Mercer-Dickinson posi-
tion. Thus, Madison asked whether they meant also to object to the 
power of judges to set aside such acts of Congress as might in their view 
be inconsistent even with the most explicit constitutional restrictions lim-
iting the powers of Congress, such as those provided in the draft of arti-
cle I, section 9, forbidding bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. 
Madison adverted also to the suggestion of several members that an ad-
ditional bill of rights might eventually be forthcoming. He wished to 
know whether the objection to judicial review would apply to that as 
well? Mercer allowed as how he could see that that might be a different 
matter; his objection was not necessarily directed to that kind of judicial 
review. 
Wilson wanted to know whether Mercer and Dickinson meant also 
to object to the construction of the judicial power as it might be called 
69. Id. 
70. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 429 (1937). 
71. Id. 
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upon in a particular case to determine the consistency of state laws with 
the Constitution. Mercer replied that as to these, there were in his view 
inadequate political safeguards against possible unconstitutional abuses 
by the states, and therefore he concurred that the judicial power of con-
stitutional review should be preserved in such instances. 72 
Wilson was followed by Randolph, who said: "What about separa-
tion of powers questions? If Congress were to encroach upon a power the 
proposed Constitution assigns solely to the President, but to do so in the 
guise of interpreting one of its own powers among those enumerated in 
article L section 8, what then?" Mercer responded that he believed a 
very good argument could be made that in that instance, too, there was 
no real need to permit the courts any authority to pass on such ques-
tions, 73 although he did not desire to press the issue at this time. 
The discussion continued in the same vein, as delegate after delegate 
queried Mercer and Dickinson with variations on the same question, i.e., 
the scope of the judicial power with respect to cases "arising under" the 
Constitution. They parried each in turn, although -Madison did not 
catch all of the answers until he noted his own attempt to provide a 
summary: 
MADISON: Let me see if I understand the right honorable members' 
position. That at least with respect to any question arising in a case where 
the objection is that Congress has not acted within any of the enumerated 
powers we are proposing in the federalism plan of article I, section 8, but 
has, instead, formulated a rule that invades the reserved powers of the 
several states, or has even acted on the states themselves to direct them or 
restrict them within their own operation in a manner alleged to be wholly 
unauthorized by this Constitution, the sole recourse shall be merely polit-
ical, le., entirely exclusive of the judicial power? 
After Mercer and Dickinson said that this indeed was precisely and only 
what they had in mind, Madison records himself as having then said: 
MADISON: But since, when this Constitution is presented, its ratification 
will be sought partly on the basis that its integrity will be assured by the 
obligation of courts, does not our own minimum obligation to the people 
require us to disclose the important exception you have proposed? 
Mercer and Dickinson purported not to understand Madison~ point. In 
an evident effort to make it clear, Madison explained: "Well, I have 
seen a draft of remarks Mr. Wilson evidently intends to use hereafter on 
December 7, 1787, to endorse ratification in the Pennsylvania Conven-
72. For clarification of Mercer's concern on this point, see, e.g., Marshall's discussion in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431-37 (1819), and 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920) ("I do not think the United States would come to an end ifwe lost 
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we 
could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States."). 
73. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 42, at 263. 
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tion. At that time, Mr. Wilson proposes to provide express assurance to 
his fellow Pennsylvanians by telling them: 
If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by this 
instrument in congress, the judges, as a consequence of their indepen-
dence, and the particular powers of government being defined, will de-
clare such law to be null and void. 74 
''I have also seen a draft of quite an impassioned plea for ratification 
I understand a young lawyer, John Marshall, may make in the Virginia 
Constitutional Convention (of 1788). In it, Marshall will say: 
If they [Congress], were to make a law not warranted by any of the 
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the [national] judges as an 
infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would 
not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would 
declare it void . . . . To what quarter will you look for protection from 
an infringement of the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the 
judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such a protection.75 
''Indeed, prior to your novel proposal, to exempt every federalism 
issue from the judicial power, I had secured agreement with John Jay 
and with Alexander Hamilton to author a lengthy series of pseudony-
mous essays in elaboration and support of the Constitution. In those 
essays, which we hope might well serve beyond the immediate cause of 
ratification in New York, we intend to defend judicial review most espe-
cially as addressed to acts of Congress. For instance, this is what we say 
specifically about the point you have raised: 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional 
judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon 
them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that 
this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected 
from any particular provisions in the constitution. . . . It is far more 
rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate 
body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as 
a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning 
as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legisla-
tive body. If there should happen to be an irreconcileable variance be-
tween the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought 
of course to be preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought to be 
preferred to the statute . . . .'116 
"Well," Madison summed up, ''I think now you may see the diffi-
culty. The Constitution does not now declare the power of constitutional 
74. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 489 (1836). 
75. A. BEVERIDGE, I THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 452 (1916) (emphasis in original). 
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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review as well as it should, other than what may be implied in the clause 
in article III (as it provides for the judicial power to extend to all cases 
arising under the Constitution). But it is clear from what I have said 
that the common understanding of that power will be emphasized. In-
deed, if the material I have just quoted is even a fair sample, I suppose 
the expectation of that power may be relied upon equally as much as 
anything else, to assure the people of the safety of this proposed Consti-
tution. If, however, we now mean to withhold the judicial power on the 
one question that currently most agitates the nation (by which I mean 
the federalism question), surely we have some duty to say so in an appro-
priate way. 
"Perhaps the most forthright means to establish the exception you 
desire," Madison said to Mercer and Dickinson, "can be provided by an 
express clause. Such a clause can be drafted as an addition to the enu-
merated powers of Congress, to place the po,wer exclusively where you 
insist it belongs. Thus, solely to test this convention's sentiment for your 
view," Madison continued, ''and to make clear that neither state nor 
federal courts may regard any federalism question as justiciable, I pro-
pose we consider the following clause: 
Article L Section 8, Clause 19: Congress shall have the final authority to 
interpret the scope of the foregoing enumerated powers." 
Mercer and Dickinson demurred to the proposal, exclaiming that it 
was not their purpose to put the proposition so bluntly. It would unduly 
excite the country, they thought, as well as draw attention away from 
the balance of the Constitution. They favored the new Constitution, 
they declared, and did not wish to see its chances for ratification so 
severely compromised as this form of carrying their proposal into effect 
was bound to do. Besides, they added, they were not at all sure it needed 
to be done in this fashion. 
After further discussion which went largely unreported (although 
personal notes taken by Yates suggest that most of it was lost in uncivil 
suggestions that Mercer and Dickinson's ideas were crazy and could 
only be entertained by persons secretly opposed to the Constitution), 
Madison evidently made one more attempt to reconcile the convention 
delegates. 
''It appears that some members think there may be merit in the 
position taken by Mr. Mercer and Mr. Dickinson," he suggested, 
"although most delegates seem overwhelmingly opposed. Even so, in 
fairness it also appears to me that few in this assembly are quite confi-
dent of the manner in which judicial review will operate, despite the fact 
that virtually all seem resolved to provide for it. 
"Our shared uncertainties, however, are not difficult to understand. 
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After all, the English have provided us with virtually no examples of 
constitutional judicial review, and the experience we have accumulated 
from the states in respect to judicial review is admittedly quite modest. 
''May we go forward to provide for it as already proposed, but to 
leave its use subject to discontinuance in this one respect only, whenever 
in the view of the Supreme Court it would become appropriate to give it 
up? If so, it would be sufficient so to provide in article III in a suffi-
ciently straightforward manner as to make the proposition clear to the 
people, as well as to make clear to the Supreme Court the limited excep-
tion Mercer and Dickinson may have in mind. Simply to test the senti-
ment of this body, I therefore propose the following addition to article 
IIL· 
Article /IL Section 4: No Act of Congress shall be called in question in 
any court, whether of the United States or of any State, on grounds of 
exceeding the enumerated powers of Congress or usurping the reserved 
powers of the states or regulating them directly in ways alleged to be unau-
thorized by this Constitution, whenever in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court the political safeguards of federalism are sufficient per se." 
Madison's effort to flush out the position first taken by Mercer and 
Dickinson lost by a vote of twelve states to none. Even Mercer and Dick-
inson voted against it, after saying they frankly did not wish to advertise 
such a proposition as they were certain it would doom the entire 
Constitution. 
As the session adjourned, however, Mercer was overheard to say qui-
etly to Dickinson: ''Perhaps we have not seen the last of this, despite the 
impression that the matter has now been settled - that judicial review 
of acts of Congress is obviously an expected obligation under the pro-
posed Constitution, most particularly to keep Congress within the 
boundaries of authority proposed under the plan of federalism. The fact 
remains that little more than the mere fidelity of the judges to that obli-
gation may sustain it in actual practice. " 
VII 
Unique among national constitutions of its day, the American 
Constitution remains quite special, even now. In yielding the check of 
judicial review to the claims of constitutive process, however, the 
Court renders this Constitution entirely ordinary. It is a mistake of 
historic proportions. 
Written constitutions are now quite commonplace. The majority 
of the world's 160 written constitutions also provide for some facsimile 
of separated powers. Many reflect federalism provisions, and most 
have "guarantees" of personal rights. The majority of these constitu-
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tions, however, are merely precatory; they are subject to such flexibili-
ties of meaning and nonmeaning as constitutive politics determine. 
The study of constitutional law in such countries is relatively unim-
portant - the constitution is pretty much what each nation's national 
politics say it is. 
Put bluntly, this is the proposition ultimately embedded in the crit-
ical portion of Justice Blackmun's Garcia opinion. To be sure, it is put 
on the basis of the best of motives, namely, to democratize the Consti-
tution, to keep it closer to "the people," and correspondingly to leave 
it largely to them (or, rather, to their politics) to measure the bounda-
ries it lays down. But paradoxically, to the extent that that is the case, 
it is not really "our" Constitution that is being expounded at all - not 
a Constitution as law, but a constitution of more ordinary politics, of 
organized influence - a constitution taken only as seriously as "con-
stitutive processes" provide. 
It is quite clear, however, that our Constitution was meant to do 
more, despite what the Court now so mildly suggests. And it is that 
Constitution that was internationally famous, largely because it was 
thought to do more. There is not the slightest suggestion that the 
Court was expected to take federalism questions more lightly than 
other questions or to punt them away when they came. Quite the op-
posite assurances were laid up in the making of this Constitution. 
There is not the slightest indication even now, in 1985, that an express 
amendment proposing to do what the tentative jurisprudence of the 
Garcia opinion presumes to have done, would stimulate any enthusi-
asm. There is no evidence of any popular desire at all, in short, for the 
sort of self-abnegating nonrole the Court has presumed to take on for 
itself with respect to federalism issues. To the contrary, it is most 
likely, if the matter were put to a fair referendum, that the mass of 
American citizens would vote emphatically for a Court at least equally 
assiduous on matters of federalism as on other matters that may hap-
pen to be of more intense personal interest to its members. 77 
The Usery decision itself, moreover, was greeted with no rush of 
punitive legislation in Congress, either to strip the Court of some seg-
ment of its appellate jurisdiction or otherwise to overturn or outflank 
the outcome of the case. For all that one can tell, there was at most a 
slight ripple of mild surprise - that a Court so long thought to be a 
virtual nonentity in such matters and having already allowed so much 
else to pass over the boundaries of federalism had rallied a small veto. 
It is necessarily a matter for private conjecture, of course, but one may 
77. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (opinion for the Court by Justice Blackmun). 
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even imagine some few members of Congress mustering a modicum of 
personal relief and institutional affection following Usery: relief, with 
the prospect of at least some abatement in the apparent insatiability of 
constituent pressures to interfere with state government; affection, for 
a Court that had at last adjudicated something other than race, reli-
gion, abortion, and crime. Usery, in short, far from necessarily dis-
crediting the Court, may, to the contrary, have even restored some 
mild credibility to the Court's historic claims of institutional neutral-
ity. The Court, in some small measure, had come home. 
Insofar as this may have been so, while Garcia is an opinion writ-
ten in deference to the political process and in praise of congressional 
good sense (to strike the right balance between national needs and lo-
cal concerns), it is at best almost certainly premature. It is entirely 
doubtful whether a Court so conducting itself may correctly claim that 
it is simply yielding its role in deference to some national consensus. 
There is in fact no evidence that "the people" have any desire at all for 
the Supreme Court so to act - to yield to Congress the constitutional 
determination of the boundaries of federalism. In requiring no special 
justification by Congress for treating state governments as mere pri-
vate commercial actors in pursuit of advantage within such markets as 
Congress may otherwise regulate ("among states" or "with foreign na-
tions"), moreover, with no showing of connectedness or factual foun-
dation at all, the Garcia opinion did more than defer -. it resigned. A 
Court so given to write in substitutionary praise of constitutive 
processes in this area of its responsibilities may appropriately have to 
answer to the terms of its rhetoric elsewhere.78 One hopes it may sen-
sibly be able to do so, but it needs thoughtfully to consider its position 
in any case. 
The tone of Garcia purports to be the tone of John Marshall, but it 
is not.79 It is, rather, the tone of a judge who, professing not to know 
wherein the law lay, left it to others to say. It is not this tone that 
makes our Supreme Court significant and distinctive. It is surely not 
this tone, moreover, that most people wish to hear. so 
78. See, e.g., note 77 supra. 
79. See note 66 supra. 
80. The argument developed in this Comment is a continuation of arguments presented else-
where on the role of the Court, standards of judicial review, and processes of constitutional 
change. Van Alstyne, supra note 14; Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful 
Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 FLA. L. REv. 209 (1983). 
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